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BILLY JENKINS AND ETERNAL VERITIES:
THE 1973 OBSCENITY CASES
RODRIC B. SCHOEN*
I. PROLOGUE
In July 1973, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Billy Jen-
kins' conviction for exhibiting an obscene film in Albany, Georgia.1
The film? Carnal Knowledge. Fortunately for Billy Jenkins, the
United States Supreme Court has agreed to review his obscenity
conviction, 2 which was upheld by the Georgia court only a few
days after the Supreme Court decided a quintet of significant ob-
scenity cases on June 21, 1973.3 Billy's fate is uncertain, and pre-
dicting the outcome of cases pending before the Supreme Court
is plainly imprudent. Because the Georgia court's opinion discloses
knowledge of the Supreme Court's 1973 obscenity decisions4 it
seems unlikely that Billy's case will be summarily remanded to
the state court for additional consideration. Despite the dissenting
opinions filed with the Georgia court's decision, nothing suggests
that the Georgia majority would change its mind regarding the
obscene nature of the film Carnal Knowledge. Billy's case, then,
may well be the first decision to apply the substance of the Court's
recent obscenity cases, and scarcely any set of facts, real or imagi-
nary, could better illustrate the significance of these obscenity de-
cisions than Jenkins v. Georgia.5
II. OBSCENITY IN REVIEW: 1957-1973
Only 17 years ago, in the 1957 case of Roth v. United States,
6
a majority of the Supreme Court decided that obscene material
* B.A. University of Colorado, 1956; J.D. University of New Mexico, 1966; Professor of
Law, Texas Tech University.
1. Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183 (1973).
2. Jenkins v. Georgia, 94 S.Ct. 719 (1973).
3. The five cases are cited in full at note 18 infra.
4. 199 S.E.2d at 184-85.
5. 94 S.Ct. 719 (1973), noting probable jurisdiction.
6. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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was not protected by the first and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution. Once the Court ruled that obscenity was an exception
to the first and fourteenth amendments, a constitutional definition
of obscenity was necessary to mark the boundary between that
material which is protected by the Constitution and that which is
not. So the Court, in the same decision, was compelled to formulate
its first-but not its last-definition of obscenity. The Court's travail
with obscenity was merely begun by Roth in 1957, to which the
bewildering array of obscenity decisions following Roth attests.
For approximately ten years after Roth, until 1967, the Court's
obscenity decisions were too frequently notable for the absence of
a majority opinion, whether the issue was the definition of obscenity
or some collateral problem arising from local, state and federal
efforts to suppress obscene material. By 1967, the collective voice
of the Court had become so fragmented that a policy of summary,
per curiam reversals was adopted for obscenity convictions when
at least five Justices, "applying their separate tests," 7 found the
challenged material protected by the Constitution. At best, the law
of obscenity was reduced to disturbing uncertainty, which had its
effects on the lower state and federal courts, legislative bodies,
prosecutors and those persons engaged in the creation and commer-
cial distribution of questionable or borderline material, including
books, magazines, and films.
Probably the greatest uncertainty surrounding obscenity and the
continuing vitality of the Court's 1957 Roth definition resulted from
the Court's peculiar 1966 decision re Fanny Hill;s its 1967 per
curiam opinion in Redrup v. New York, when the Court, in ill-con-
cealed frustration, admitted that disagreement among the Justices
apparently precluded decision by a majority or even substantial
plurality opinion; and the Court's failure to decide whether questions
of obscenity should be determined by national or lesser "contem-
porary community standards." '10
In Fanny Hill, a plurality of three Justices, elaborating on the
Roth definition of obscenity, declared that no book may be "pro-
scribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming social
value. ' 11 The Fanny Hill plurality also asserted that the element
of social value may not be weighed against, nor canceled out by,
the presence of "prurient appeal" and "patent offensiveness," which
were the two elements later added to the Roth definition of obscenity.
7. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 n.3 (1973).
8. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 83 U.S. 418 (1966).
9. 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
10. E.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
11. 383 U.S. at 419.
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Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the result reached by
the plurality,12 but only because they believed that the Constitution
prohibited government regulation of expression, whether obscene
or not. While no majority opinion emerged from Fanny Hill, the
plurality Justices plus Justices Black and Douglas commanded five
of the nine votes. After Fanny Hill, it seemed that no material,
regardless of its prurient appeal and patent offensiveness, could
be found obscene unless it were utterly without redeeming social
value. Many states responded by adding the Fanny Hill standard
of "utterly without redeeming social value" to their statutory defi-
nition of obscenity,13 a response dictated solely by the membership
of the Supreme Court on the day Fanny Hill was decided, not
by a majority opinion of the Court.
In 1967, a year after Fanny Hill, in a per curiam reversal
of a state obscenity conviction in Redrup v. New York" the Court
observed that no claim was made that the state's obscenity statute
reflected "a specific and limited" concern for juveniles, 5 nor was
it suggested that the challenged material had been published in
a manner "so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling
individual to avoid exposure to it."16 These cryptic observations
caused additional uncertainty. Was a majority of the Court now
prepared to hold that "consenting adults" were to be allowed access
to obscene material, and that the scope of permissible regulation
of obscenity under the Constitution was limited to protecting juveniles
and the sensibilities of adults who wished to avoid obscene material?
A final uncertainty pervading the law of obscenity and dating
from the Roth decision was whether the question of obscenity was
to be decided by reference to local, state or national standards
when the definition adopted by the Court required that an average
person, applying contemporary community standards, find that the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole apepals to pruri-
ent interest.17 What community? A conscientious jury might well
reach different results when instructed to decide contemporary com-
munity standards by reference to an average person residing in
the United States, residing in a particular state, or residing in
a particular region, county or town within a state. Again, the Su-
preme Court was either unwilling or unable to resolve this collateral
but important question by majority opinion.
Thoughtful students of the Court are likely to assert that the
12. Id. at 421 (Black, J., concurring), 424 (Douglas, J., concurring).
13. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (West 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101 (1972) TEX.
PENAL CODE § 43.21 (Vernon 1974).
14. 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
15. Id. at 769.
16. Id.
17. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
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preceding discussion raises only a few of the problems, uncertain-
ties, or unanswered questions flowing from the Roth decision. This
assertion is accurate. Admittedly, the foregoing catalog of "obscenity
problems" is not exhaustive, nor was it so intended. But the purpose
of this paper is to consider some problems in the law of obscenity,
not all problems, and to consider how these problems were resolved
by the Court's 1973 obscenity decisions.
III. THE 1973 OBSCENITY DECISIONS
In June, 1973, the Supreme Court decided five obscenity cases,
each by a majority opinion.,' Perhaps the reappearance of a "ma-
jority" in this perplexing area of constitutional law is alone sufficient-
ly momentous to make the decisions significant, even without con-
sidering the substance of the decisions. After a long period of un-
certainty, a judicial decision offering tantalizing visions of certainty
might be embraced with relief simply for that reason. But even
five majority opinions in the 1973 obscenity decisions are less certain
than one might suppose, for as Chief Justice Burger, who wrote
for the majority in each case, observed: "[t]his [obscenity]
is an area in which there are few eternal verities."' 9 Considering
the history of obscenity litigation before the Court in the years
from 1957 to 1973, few would fault his assessment.
Whether one applauds or condemns the 1973 obscenity decisions,
the majority did not overrule any well-settled precedent, but simply
resolved some open questions in an intensely controversial area
of constitutional law. How long these answers endure in the form
selected by the majority is simply another unanswerable question.
Evaluating the 1973 obscenity decisions by reference to the majority
Justices explains nothing. The relevant inquiry is what was decided,
not who decided it.
Of the five 1973 obscenity decisions, Miller v. California" seems
the most important and is therefore discussed at length in this
paper. Among the four remaining 1973 obscenity decisions are United
States v. 12 Reels of Film2l and United States v. Orito, 2 2 which
presented questions concerning the power of Congress to prohibit
importation or interstate transportation of obscene material. Al-
though the Court held in Stanley v. Georgia 2 that possession of
obscene material for personal use in the privacy of the home could
18. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) ; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973) ; Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973) ; United States v. 12 Reels of Film, 413
U.S. 123 (1973) ; and United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
19. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
20. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
21. 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
22. 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
23. 894 U.S. 557 (1969).
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not be made a crime, the Court in subsequent cases,2 4 of which
12 Reels of Film and Orito are the latest, has ruled that the Stanley
"exception" to criminal statutes proscribing the possession or dis-
tribution of obscene material does not extend to importation or
interstate carriage of obscenity for personal use. The somewhat
puzzling effect of Stanley and its progeny is that privacy of the
home prevents state intrusion to seize or punish for the possession
of obscene material for personal use, but that collectors and pur-
veyors of obscenity for personal use are without lawful means to
bring the obscene material within the privacy of the home.2 5 In
another decision, Kaplan v. California,26 the Court held that a book
consisting solely of written descriptions of sexual conduct could
be found obscene. Although one picture may be worth a thousand
words, obscene words alone are not protected by the first amend-
ment. Finally, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,27 the Court held
that the prosecution need not present "expert" evidence on the
question of obscenity when the challenged material itself is placed
in evidence, and that a state, as a permissible exercise of its police
power, may prohibit the exhibition of obscene films to so-called
"consenting adults." For some Paris Theatre may seem the most
important of the five 1973 obscenity decisions, but if judgments
on relative importance are possible, Miller v. California 2 prevails
over Paris Theatre because Miller provides a new definition of
obscenity.
A. MILLER V. CALIFORNIA
Briefly summarized, the Miller majority formulated a new defi-
nition of obscenity, holding that the trier of fact in an obscenity
proceeding, civil or criminal, need not decide the question of obscen-
ity by "national" standards. Obscenity is a class of sex material
not protected by the first and fourteenth amendments to the Con-
stitution, a description which states simply the substance of the
Court's holding in Roth. 29 The majority in Miller might have avoided
the task of formulating a new definition of sex material not protect-
ed by the Constitution if it had overruled Roth as an unfortunate
aberration in constitutional jurisprudence. Had this been the result
of Miller, obscene material would then receive the full protection
of the Constitution, subject only to those narrow limitations generallly
24. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971), and United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363. (1971).
25. If obscenity is an exception to the protection of the first amendment, private pos-
session of obscene material for personal use Is an exception to the exception to the first
amendment.
26. 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
27. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
28. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
29. Reth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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applied to the exercise of first amendment rights, and which, for
want of a better phrase, are adequately suggested by reference
to the "clear and present danger" test.30 But the Court in Miller
did not overrule the primary holding of Roth, and obscenity remains
beyond the protection of the first amendment. The Miller majority
could not entirely avoid Roth, however, for once the Court had
ruled in Roth that obscenity was not protected by the Constitution,
it was necessary to provide a legal standard by which the obscene
is distinguished from the non-obscene. Despite the majority's claim
in Miller that is was merely formulating "standards more con-
crete""1 than had been used since Roth, the "new" standard an-
nounced in Miller seems substantially more than a clarification
or refinement of the Roth definition of obscenity. This evaluation
of Miller, that it provides a new definition rather than a slight
adjustment of the Roth definition, depends on the precise definition
of obscenity first forumlated in Roth and the difference, if any,
between it and the Miller definition.
Although the Court's first definition of obscenity proved wanting
in the general fragmentation of opinions following Roth, the Court
in Roth held that obscenity was to be decided by the answer to
this question:
[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. 82
Sixteen years later, in Miller, a different majority announced this
definition of obscenity, phrased in queries to the trier of fact:
[Whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest ... whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law ...
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.83
The Miller Court's elaboration of the new definition discloses that
the trier of fact must answer "yes" to each of the three queries
comprising the new definition before the challenged material may
be held obscene, for the component elements are conjunctive and
a negative response to any of the three queries will place the
80. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
31. 413 U.S. at 20, 29.
82. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
$3. 413 U.S. at 24.
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material beyond the state's regulatory authority and within the pro-
tection of the first amendment3 4
For the sake of brevity and later reference, the three elements
of the new Miller definition of obscenity are described hereafter
as (1) the "prurient interest" test, (2) the "patently offensive"
test, and (3) the "serious value" test. The first element of the
Miller definition represents, in identical language, the whole defi-
nition of obscenity first offered in Roth; the second and third ele-
ments are new additions. Those who have followed the law of ob-
scenity in the Supreme Court will have encountered the second
and third Miller elements here and there in various opinions written
by the Justices in the years between Roth and Miller. When the
second and third elements are added to the Roth definition (which
is also the first element of the new definition), they seem to limit
the Roth definition. But adoption of the second and third elements
together with the first in a conjunctive three-element definition
makes each element a limitation on the others. Conceding that
Miller has added new elements to the Roth definition of obscenity,
do these additions only clarify Roth, or do they change the Roth
definition? And if these new elements do change the Roth definition,
how may the change in definition affect the uncertain line separat-
ing material which is protected by the Constitution and that which
is not?
The second element of the Miller definition, that of "patently
offensive sex conduct," limits the first element by excluding from
suppression material which may appeal to the prurient interest but
which does so, apparently, in a less vivid or obtrusive manner,
with "taste" perhaps. The Miller majority illustrates by "plain ex-
amples" what is meant by the second element in these words:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ulti-
mate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of mas-
turbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.35
While the Court's examples disclose the activity which may be
proscribed, the Court fails to illustrate the quality of representation
or description separating the patently offensive from the patently
inoffensive. Explicit representations or descriptions of sexual activ-
ities are not per se proscribed, but only those which are patently
offensive. Because the crucial phrase "patently offensive" cannot
be defined abstractly except by listing roughly equivalent synonyms,
which are themselves abstract unless applied to a particular repre-
34. Id. at 24-26.
35. Id. at 25.
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sentation or description of sex conduct activity, it seems that the
"patently offensive" element remains a wholly personal judgment
for each trier of fact, judge or juror.36
Considered without reference to the third element, the second
element of the Miller definition of obscenity substantially restricts
the Roth definition, for state law must specifically describe the
sex conduct which may be the subject of an obscenity proceeding,
civil or criminal. The law may not merely proscribe that which
is "obscene;" the law must describe particular sex conduct which
is obscene. 8 7 Of course the Court's examples do not purport to
exhaust all "sexual conduct" that might be obscene; indeed, the
line between sexual and non-sexual conduct is scarcely self-demon-
strating. An unsually inventive legislature might well provide defi-
nitions of "sexual conduct" substantially exceeding in variety and
scope the examples offered by the Court in Miller. To this extent,
then, the second element of Miller modifies the Roth definition by
casting upon legislatures and courts the burden of defining specific
sexual conduct, and so provides an objective foundation for obscenity
proceedings, a refreshing change from the largely subjective Roth
definition.
But even if a state legislature or court incorporates in its list
of defined "sexual conduct" the "patently offensive" qualification,
this part of the constitutional definition of obscenity remains largely
subjective, a question of judgment for the trier of fact. When this
second element of the Miller definition, combining objective and
subjective sub-elements, is added to Roth, the Roth definition is
altered by significantly constricting the category of material to
which the 1957 definition might theoretically have applied. Although
the material, taken as a whole, may appeal to the prurient interest
(Roth), it may not be held obscene unless it also contains patently
offensive representations or depictions of sexual conduct specifically
defined by law (Miller). The second element of Miller seems to
enlarge the category of material that may claim first amendment
protection under the theoretical reach of the earlier Roth definition.
Does the third element of the Miller definition, the "serious
value" test, change or merely clarify the Roth definition? When
36. What is "patently offensive" is essentially a question of fact. Id. at 30.
87. The specifically described sex conduct that may invite an obscenity prosecution must
be found within the statute, as written or authoratively construed. 413 U.S. at 24, 27.
Hence, failure to specifically describe the forbidden sex conduct within the statute may be
rectified by state judicial construction, allowing the statute to be applied to certain sex
conduct not defined by statute. Until the statute is rewritten by the legislature, courts may
safely construe the general words "lewd" and "obscene" to mean the specific sex conduct
provided as examples by the majority in Miller. See text accompanying note 35 supra. If
the United States Supreme Court may, under the first amendment, construe the general
words of the federal obscenity statutes to reach at least the examples of sex conduct pro-
vided in Miller, surely the state courta way do likewise. United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of
Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973),
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compared to the usual formulation of the Roth definition, Miller's
third element, like the second, appears to restrict the theoretical
limits of -Roth, so that material appealing to the prurient interest
and containing patently offensive representations or depictions of
sexual conduct specifically defined by law may nevertheless claim
first amendment protection if it is found to have "serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value." Whether Miller's third element
restricts or enlarges the category of material theoretically within
the usual Roth definition of obscenity depends largely on the Court's
explanation for holding in Roth that obscenity was not a class of
expression protected by the Constitution. In Roth, the Court said:
"[I]mplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance."3 18
Later, in Fanny Hill,39 three Justices declared that allegedly obscene
material could not be suppressed unless it were found "utterly with-
out redeeming social value, '40 and that the "social value" of chal-
lenged material was not to be weighed or balanced against its
prurient interest and patent offensiveness. Three Justices dissented
in Fanny Hill, and all disagreed with the plurality's assertion that
material with redeeming social value, however slight, could not
be found obscene under the Constitution. Rejection of the conjunctive
redeeming social value test expressed by the Fanny Hill plurality
reached majority proportions in 1973, for the Court in Miller sep-
cifically rejected the Fanny Hill plurality test and substituted the
third element of the Miller definition.
If the Roth definition of obscenity rests on the explicit premise
that material cannot be found obscene unless it is utterly without
redeeming social importance, as surely it does, why should it be
objectionable to make that explicit premise a part of the constitu-
tional test when the issue of obscenity is presented to the trier
of fact? A direct answer to this question is not found in Miller.
The majority does indicate that requiring the prosecution to prove
a negative, that the challenged material is utterly without redeeming
social value, is virtually impossible under American standards of
proof in criminal proceedings. 41 Since the majority in Miller re-
places the "redeeming social value" test with another negative test,
that the challenged material lacks serious value, it seems the ma-
jority is not genuinely concerned with a negative burden imposed
on the prosecution. Moreover, an obscenity prosecution is always
essentially negative, regardless of definitional elements, for the pros-
ecution, civil or criminal, always seeks to establish that the chal-
38. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
39. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 419 (1966).
40. Id. at 419.
41. 413 U.S. at 22.
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lenged material is not protected by the Constitution. That this burden
is composed of both affirmative and negative elements is hardly
surprising. Proving a negative, as an abstract question of evidence,
is obviously a much different problem than proving that allegedly
obscene material is utterly without redeeming social value, where
the negative burden may involve nothing more than disagreement
between witnesses for the prosecution and the defense. Mindful of
the typical obscenity proceeding, where the challenged material is
physically present in the court for all to examine, the Court's reason
for rejecting the Roth "redeeming social value" test is singularly
unpersuasive.
A more satisfying explanation for rejecting the Roth "redeeming
social value" test is that the Miller majority found the standard
unacceptably broad because purveyors of pornography would seek
to rely upon it and conscientious triers of fact might heed it, thus
exonerating material which ought to be proscribed, especially when
"expert" evidence offered by the prosecution and the defense was
contradictory on the issue of any redeeming social value. The Miller
majority also declares that no more than three Justices had ever
adhered to the "utterly without redeeming social value" test as
part of the constitutional definition of obscenity.42 This assertion
appears incorrect, for Roth was a majority opinion and the "utterly
without redeeming social value" standard was an explicit justifica-
tion for holding obscenity beyond the protection of the first amend-
ment in Roth. Finally, in a footnote, the Miller Court rejected,
as a constitutional standard for obscenity, the ambiguous Roth test
of "social importance. 4 With all respect for the majority in Miller,
and recognizing the unenviable task confronting the Court in defin-
ing a class of expression not protected by the Constitution, and
conceding that "social importance" or "social value," is ambiguous,
the Court's new test of lacking "serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value" is scarcely less ambiguous than the test it
replaces. The word "serious" is ambiguous; it requires a wholly
subjective reaction by the individual who must make the assess-
ment. Unless the defense admits that the challenged material is
not "serious," only personal and subjective judgments govern this
issue. Similarly, using the words "literary, artistic, political, or
scientific" as additional limitations in the "serious value" of the
challenged material invites the same subjective and personal judg-
ments concerning what these words mean and what they exclude.
Reliance upon these wholly subjective elements as part of the
constitutional definition of obscenity is the ineluctable consequence
42. Id. at 25.
43. Id. at 25 n.7.
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of construing the first amendment to protect only that expression
which has "value" or "importance."But "value or importance"
to whom? A court may apply neutral principles to distinguish pro-
tected expression from unprotected conduct,4 4 and a court may
limit the circumstances under which protected expression is allowed
by neutral considerations of time, manner, and place,4 5 all without
judging the value or importance of any particular expression. Indeed,
a court may even proscribe expression that poses a clear and present
danger without judging the value or importance of that expression.46
But limiting the protection of the first amendment to expression
that has value or importance introduces a mischievous and subjec-
tive standard which could destroy the first amendment. When free-
dom of expression means only freedom to express what others may
judge to have value or importance, the freedom enjoyed is purely
contingent, which seems the precise status of obscenity under the
first amendment.
If the Miller definition of obscenity excites concern for the future
of the first amendment, recall that Miller is merely a continuation
of a process of limiting the protection of the first amendment begun
17 years ago in Roth. Considered together, Roth and Miller are
merely representative of more disturbing anomalies in first amend-
ment jurisprudence: Expression undeniably "important" may be
proscribed if it threatens a "clear and present danger," but expres-
sion wholly lacking "importance" may be proscribed even when
no "clear and present danger" is readily perceived.47 Although
the Miller majority rejected, and apparently overruled, the "utterly
without redeeming social value" test upon which the Roth definition
of obscenity was explicitly predicated, and for reasons which seem
upon examination unpersuasive, the question remains, does the third
element of the Miller definition of obscenity significantly change
the Roth definition?
No obvious answer emerges from Miller, for the difference be-
tween material "utterly without redeeming social importance (or
value)" and material which "lacks serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value" seems largely a question of nuance. An elaborate
discussion of nuances is more likely to confuse than to clarify any
question, and the law of obscenity seems no exception. Perhaps
the new Miller element will have a practical impact on obscenity
44. E.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
45. E.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
46. E.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
47. The most obvious "clear and present danger" likely to arise from exposure to so-
called hard core pornography is the commission of overt sex crimes, but there seems to be
no data demonstrating a cause-and-effect relationship between exposure to hard core por-
nography and sex crimes. See Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 107-13 (1973).
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litigation at the trial level by easing slightly the "virtually impos-
sible" burden borne by the prosecution under the now discredited
Roth element; perhaps conscientious triers of fact will find the
Miller standard less difficult to apply; perhaps the class of material
protected by the first amendment will not be further diminished
with the Miller element substituted for that of Roth. But witnesses
who before Miller testified that challenged material was not without
some redeeming social importance will probably now be able to
testify that the same material is not lacking in serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
Whatever the test, it remains wholly subjective, finally a ques-
tion of personal judgment and individual opinion. As if to underscore
this point, the Miller majority offers as its only example of the
"serious value" element, medical books that "for the education
of physicians . . . necessarily use graphic illstrations and descrip-
tions of human anatomy. ' 4 So they do, but has any prosecutor,
trial judge, or layperson ever thought for a moment that legitimate
medical books could be found obscene under any definition of the
term? Although the majority in Miller concludes that only "hard
core pornography" is excluded from first amendment protection'4 9
this characterization adds little to the new definition of obscenity.
Pornography, as the Court explains, is sex material, and hard core
pornography is sex material which is found obscene by applying
the three definitional elements announced in Miller.
The foregoing discussion of the "patently offensive sex conduct"
and "serious value" elements of the Miller test for obscenity sug-
gests that the class of material theoretically within the reach of
the Roth definition has been restricted rather than enlarged by
Miller because the "patently offensive sex conduct" test requires
objective definition of the proscribed sexual conduct; the "patently
offensive" qualification, while still subjective, nevertheless imposes
some standard on a conscientious trier of fact, requires something
more than appeal to prurient interest, and may provide an addi-
tional basis for trial court rulings that challenged material is not
obscene as a matter of law. The impact of the Miller "serious
value" element in terms of restricting or enlarging the class of
materials theoretically within the reach of the Roth definition is
less clear. Miller replaces one subjective test with another subjec-
tive test not substantially different than that replaced, unless it
be that the Roth test of "utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance" suggests a quantitative subjective test while Miller suggests
a more qualitative subjective test. If this were all Miller decided,
48. 413 U.S. at 26.
49. Id. at 27, 29, 35, 36.
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it might be possible to conclude that Miller had restricted the Roth
definition of obscenity, though the question is not free of doubt.
Announcing a new definition of obscene material might seem
quite enough for a single majority opinion, but an additional question
in the law of obscenity was answered in Miller. Roth first held
that reference to "contemporary community standards" was critical
in deciding an issue of obscenity, and this part of the Roth definition
is perpetuated as the first element of the Miller three-element defi-
nition of obscenity. Although the "contemporary community stand-
ards" element remains a part of the constitutional test for obscenity,
Miller holds that these contemporary community standards are not
"hypothetical and unascertainable" national standards. 50 Miller pro-
vides at least a partial answer to a question unanswered since
Roth was decided in 1957: What is the relevant community whose
contemporary standards should be considered in deciding the issue
of obscenity? Eliminated from constitutional relevancy, at least for
state obscenity litigation, is the largest community whose contem-
porary standards might have been considered controlling-the com-
munity encompassed by the national boundaries of the United States
of America, or American society at large. 51 Once the Court excludes
the largest community, the national community, another question
arises: What is the smallest community whose contemporary stan-
dards might be considered under the constitutional definition of
obscenity? Nothing in the Miller opinion suggests an answer. In
Miller, the trial court instructed the jury to apply "contemporary
community standards of the State of California, '5 2 and the appellant
urged error before the Supreme Court for failure to instruct one na-
tional standards. The Miller majority concluded its discussion of
relevant community standards by declaring that the trial court's
instruction was "constitutionally adequate."5 3
Under the circumstances of the Miller case, the Court was cer-
tainly not required to decide anything more than it did concerning
the relevant community standards. State standards had been applied
during trial and the appellant argued that national standards were
required by the Constitution. There was simply no need to decide
whether reference to the contemporary standards of a smaller com-
munity than the state was "constitutionally adequate." Certainly
smaller communities than a state are available for reference, in-
cluding regions within the state, and specific counties, cities, towns,
villages, precincts, wards, and even smaller communities, if such
there are. Of course the Court might have limited the relevant
50. Id. at 31.
51. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
52. 413 U.S. at 31.
53. Id. at 34.
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community to the state if it had chosen to do so, but it did not.
Doubtlessly the question will arise in the future, perhaps during
the 1973-74 Term in Jenkins v. Georgia.54
What reasoning supports the Miller rejection of national com-
munity standards, and what are the potential first amendment con-
sequences of this holding? In rejecting national community stan-
dards, the Court explains that issues touching "prurient interest"
and "patent offensiveness" are essentially questions of fact. Invok-
ing abstract national community standards was deemed unrealistic
and futile because citizens of different states are diverse in their
tastes, a diversity that should not be "strangled by the absolutism
of imposed uniformity." By requiring the trier of fact to apply
contemporary community standards as an average person, insures
that challenged material will not be judged by its possible impact
upon the most sensitive or least sensitive person in the community. 55
Because the first amendment applies to the states through the four-
teenth amendment, it is not surprising that the appellant in Miller
should assert that first amendment limitations on state power to
suppress obscenity be applied uniformly throughout the United
States. After all, the first amendment binds all the states, the line
between obscene and non-obscene material is a first amendment
question, and so the standards by which challenged material is
found within or beyond first amendment protection should be na-
tional, too. If this analysis represents the substance of the appellant's
argument in Miller, the Court answered obliquely by shifting em-
phasis from questions of law to questions of fact. Certainly issues
of "prurient interest," "patent offensiveness," and "serious value"56
are questions of fact, but they are facts that determine whether
challenged material is or is not protected by the first amendment.
Even conceding that "national" community standards are elusive
and abstract, allowing the trier of fact to decide the question of
obscenity by reference to state or lesser geographic community
standards is scarcely less elusive or abstract. It also obscures the
core problem in the use of an "average person-contemporary com-
munity standards" test for deciding the question of obscenity. The
problem is not so much what standard might be articulated but
rather the process by which the standard is illuminated by the
contending parties in an adversary proceeding. Assuming that the
trier of fact is conscientious and seeks to conform judgment to
law, as instructed by the court, how does any judge alone or panel
54. 94 S.Ct. 719 (1973), noting probable Jurisdiction.
55. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 80-34 (1973).
56. Although the majority in Miller indicates that the element of "serious value" is a
proper question for the trier of fact. 413 U.S. at 24, the "serious value" element is not in-
cluded in the Court's rejection of "national" community standards, id. at 30-34. The pos-
sible significance of this ommission is discussed in the text accompanying notes 81-85 4nfra.
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of jurors divine the contemporary standards of the relevant com-
munity? In a village of 100, a town of 10,000, a city of 100,000, a
metropolis of 1,000,000, or a state of 10,000,000?
Regardless of the number of witnesses presented by either side,
those witnesses can only provide reliable testimony concerning their
personal "contemporary standards," and perhaps less reliably, the
"contemporary standards" of their friends and associates. The pros-
ecution and defense might provide both expert and lay evidence
of equal weight on contemporary community standards, but the
evidence, equal in weight, will be hopelessly contradictory. Other
evidence may be equally unsatisfactory for illuminating contempo-
rary community standards of "prurient appeal," "patent offensive-
ness," and "serious value." Even the fact that a specific book,
film, or magazine has been a bestseller or broken records, been
awarded prizes or nominated, or been the subject of favorable and
serious critical review, none is necessarily conclusive on "contem-
porary standards," for the total audience may represent but a frac-
tion of the population of the "relevant community." The "average
person-contemporary community standard" test for the definition
of obscenity requires an essentially subjective judgment by the trier
of fact. True, a conscientious juror heeding a court's instructions
should attempt somehow to judge the material as if the juror were
an average person applying contemporary community standards,
but it seems this element of the definition of obscenity really invites
the trier of fact, jurors or judge, to apply their own standards.
A jury, almost by definition, is composed of average persons, if
there is such a creature in the law, and as an average person,
each juror's subjective appraisal of contemporary standards is prob-
ably as valid as any other. If an appropriate number of jurors
agree on their appraisal of "contemporary standards," then the
material will be condemned or exonerated.
The crux of the problem, of course, is that there is no average
person and there is no single contemporary community standard.
Contemporary community standards are the individual standards
of its inhabitants, and unless there exists a homogeneous community,
"contemporary community standards" is in substance a phrase with-
out meaning, deceptive and misleading, for the very diversity that
typifies American society destroys the premise that a single or
governing contemporary community standard exists. Considered as
a definitional element of the constitutional test for obscenity, the
words "average person-contemporary community standards" are
words of art, whether the relevant community is national, state,
or local. Of course words of art, though facially misleading, are
not per se objectionable if all concerned appreciate what the words
signify. If this critical analysis of the "average person-contemporary
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community standards" definitional element of obscenity is accepted,
that it means nothing more than inviting the trier of fact to apply
his or her own standards, this scarcely requires an additional con-
clusion that the definitional element should be eliminated from the
test for obscenity.
Although obscenity is not protected by the Constitution, this
rule of law is not self-executing. A decision is required to separate
the obscene from the non-obscene, and in the United States that
decision is made at least initially by the trier of fact. The Miller
majority's three-element test of obscenity compels a subjective de-
cisional process by the trier of fact; "prurient interest, patent of-
fensiveness, and serious value" are all subjective elements which
the Miller Court has carefully blended into the constitutional defini-
tion of sex material not protected by the first amendment. It is
now pointless, if not tedious, to assert that obscenity cannot be
defined by anyone or by any court or by any legislature in a
manner satisfying due process or the first amendment. The Miller
majority was forcefully apprised of this position by the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan.5 7 Although Justice Brennan's argu-
ment might influence legislators, it did not persuade the Miller
majority. Like it or not, the constitutional definition of obscenity
does embody subjective questions which must be decided by the
trier of fact. Miller holds that the trier of fact need not be instructed
to make these subjective judgments by reference to imaginary,
vague and formless national community standards. But it is submit-
ted that divining contemporary community standards of a state
or particular city is a similarly unrewarding exercise if it is sup-
posed they are less abstract, vague and imaginary than "national
standards." State or local community standards may seem more
manageable, but in truth they are not, if consensus or certainty
on a single standard for the relevant community, nation, state,
county, or town is sought.
Considering the new definition of obscenity and the contempo-
raneous rejection of the "national community standards" test, has
not the Court in Miller ruled that the boundaries of the first amend-
ment shall be defined by local attitudes? Since the Court held the
first amendment binding on the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment, no decision has intimated that first amendment questions
arising in the states under the fourteenth amendment would or
should be decided by lesser or different standards than the pre-
vailing federal standards announced by the Supreme Court. Of course
important constitutional questions decided by the Supreme Court
57. 418 U.S. at 47, referring to Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83-93 (1973).
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may often depend upon facts decided locally, but the law of the
Constitution, as announced by the Court, is merely applied to the
facts and will be applied to the same or similar facts wherever
they might arise in the future.
In Miller, however, the definition of obscenity retains the "con-
temporary community standards" element but holds that the relevant
community is not the nation but some lesser community. This for-
mulation suggests that in state obscenity litigation, which remains
subject to the first amendment, the facts are the law and the
law is the facts. Have not the facts and the law of obscenity become
synonymous and interchangeable? Certainly one extension of Miller
is that obscenity is decided by answers to certain subjective ques-
tions, and when the trier of fact decides these facts, by less than
national standards, the facts are the law and no federal first amend-
ment question remains or may be asserted, except perhaps that
the trier of fact failed to receive or answer the proper subjective
queries. If this analysis is correct, then Miller is a remarkable
decision. New York, Iowa, Oregon, and all other states enjoy (or
suffer, as the case may be) the benefits of the same first amend-
ment, yet Miller holds that exceptions to the protection of that
constitutional provision may be determined by less than national
standards.
Although deciding questions of constitutional magnitude by ref-
erence to less than a national standard seems a novel, if not start-
ling interpretation of the first amendment, an argument that the
Court's deference to less than national standards in obscenity liti-
gation is itself unconstitutional can scarcely be maintained. The
Supreme Court interprets the Constitution, and when a majority
decides that the definition of material not protected by the first
amendment may embody subjective personal judgments resolved
by reference to less than a national community standard, as it
did in Miller, the decision could not be unconstitutional. Novelty
alone does not make a first amendment decision incorrect, but
disagreement with the Court's interpretation of the Constitution is
certainly legitimate. At the very least, it is submitted that the
resolution of first amendment questions by reference to state or
local standards should not be extended beyond the subject of ob-
scenity. Additionally, the Court's rejection of national community
standards for deciding questions of obscenity gives cause for dis-
agreement.
In Miller, the majority equates the finding of facts in an obscen-
ity proceeding with other situations where facts are decided by
reference to local standards, 5 but no authority is cited for the
58. 413 U.S. at 30.
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proposition that important questions of constitutional law may be
decided locally by applying local or state standards. Each obscenity
case does involve a constitutional question: Is the challenged ma-
terial protected by the first amendment? Why should an American
citizen who happens to live in Maine or Iowa have his individual
and personal first amendment rights under the national constitution
determined by the imaginary contemporary standards of his neigh-
bors in Maine or Iowa? This result is justified in part by the
majority's abhorrence of "strangling diversity by imposed uniform-
ity." 59 As an abstract proposition, diversity is a desirable feature
of American society, but should concerns for local' or state diversity
determine the protection accorded each citizen of the United States
by the first amendment? Considering the favored position accorded
to freedom of expression by many past decisions of the Court, na-
tional uniformity in the interpretation of first amendment rights
is considerably more important than bending the Constitution to
accommodate local attitudes and judgments on the prurient interest,
patent offensiveness, and serious value of material concerned with
sex. First amendment rights are individual rights and should be
enjoyed to their full extent by each citizen wherever he resides,
undiminished by the variables of local diversity and determined
by a reliable national standard. And the only body capable of pro-
viding a reliable national standard for judging obscenity and simul-
taneously marking out, case by case, the boundaries of the first
amendment is the United States Supreme Court.6 0
Rejection of national community standards as the required con-
stitutional guide for the trier of fact in obscenity proceedings sug-
gests that the majority in Miller may be seeking to define more
precisely the Court's role in reviewing state obscenity cases by
circumscribing or denying its own authority to pass independent
judgment on the nature of material found obscene in the states.
To be sure, the majority in Miller does not expressly declare what
its future role shall be in obscenity cases tried in conformance
with the Miller definition of obscene material, and a footnote warns
that assumptions on this subject are "pure speculation. "6' Although
59. Id. at 83.
60. The Miller majority does observe in a footnote that the use of so-called "national
community standards" might operate to proscribe material which would be otherwise ac-
ceptable locally, but obscene under national standards. Hence, the "potential for suppres-
sion seems at least as great in application of a single nationwide standard as in allowing
distribution In accordance with local tastes . . ." 413 U.S. at 32 n.13. Perhaps the Court's
observation is not without foundation, but practical considerations suggest that what is
theoretically possible Is unlikely to occur. Prosecutors may not prosecute in areas where
standards are more "permissive" than imaginary national standards, nor may local juries
convict. In any event, the first amendment should accord identical protection for expres-
sion anywhere In the United States, so exceptions to that protection should be determined
nationally as well. Deference to "local tastes" under the first amendment diffuses re-
sponsibility, especially the ultimate constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court to
delineate the boundaries of the first amendment for all citizens of the United States. Fin-
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the precise rols of the Court in reviewing obscenity cases remains
unclear, rejection of so-called national community standards for
deciding the issue of obscenity may nevertheless provide some in-
direct illumination on this issue.
Earlier in this paper it is asserted that deciding the question
of obscenity at trial with the aid of instructions to apply an "average
person-contemporary community standards" test is not much of a
test at all, regardless of whether the relevant community is local,
state, or national. But even if conscientious triers of fact are unable
to determine with any degree of certainty the contemporary stand-
ards of the relevant community, whatever that community might
be, and are finally compelled to apply individual and subjective
standards, the "average person-contemporary community standards"
test at least requires that triers of fact attempt to decide the issue
by standards other than their own. Of course the test also permits
the adversary parties to present evidence, probably contradictory,
on community standards. Miller plainly discloses that the issue of
obscenity is considered primarily a question of fact during the trial
stage,6 2 but Miller also discloses that each obscenity case reviewed
by the Supreme Court presents "tough individual problems of con-
stitutional judgment. ' 6 3 How may rejection of "national community
standards" in deciding questions of obscenity affect the scope of
the Court's "tough constitutional judgments" in future obscenity
cases? And what are the possible first amendment consequences,
immediate and remote, of the Court's rejection of national commun-
ity standards? Until the Court decides Jenkins v. Georgia 6' (and
the fate of the film Carnal Knowledge), which may convert specula-
tion to relative certainty, the preceding questions raised by Miller
are, as the Court declared, pure speculation.
Speculation on the Miller rejection of national community stand-
ards suggests these possible consequences. After Miller, all state
trial courts may exclude, on grounds of irrelevancy, any evidence
offered by either side concerning the prurient interest and patent
offensiveness of the challenged material when the evidence pertains
to the community standards of any place other than the jurisdiction
in which the trial court sits. For example, were the film Carnal
ally, the first amendment does not require that any state enact obscenity laws; a state
may enact obscenity laws. A definition of obscenity formulated by the Supreme Court as
an exception to the first amendment could logically include national community standards
as the constitutionally permissible minimum. Any locality or state might then accord
greater protection for expression than the minimum established by imaginary national
standards. While localities or state could never provide less protection for expression than
national standards allow, they may always provide more.
61. 413 U.S. at 29 n.11.
62. Id. at 24.
63. Id. at 29.
64. 94 S.Ct. 719 (1973), noting probable jurisdiction.
65. No language in Miller precludes this possibility.
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Knowledge to be prosecuted in Albany, Georgia, after Miller, any
evidence based on community standards in states other than Georgia
or cities outside Georgia is wholly irrelevant to the issues of prurient
interest and patent offensiveness of challenged material in Georgia.
Indeed, after Miller, a trial court in Albany, Georgia, might declare
that Albany alone is the relevant community and exclude evidence
of the community standards of Atlanta or the whole of Georgia. 65
A particularly zealous trial court might even seek to exclude -evi-
dence offered on Georgia community standards if offered by a non-
resident of Georgia. 66 Because a companion case to Miller, Paris
Theatre,67 holds that the prosecution need not present any evidence
on the issue of obscenity if the challenged material is presented
in court for examination and judgment by the trier of fact,68 ob-
viously the evidentiary consequences of rejecting national community
standards will fall most heavily upon the defense when a strict
interpretation of Miller is adopted by state trial courts.
Specific rejection of national community standards by Miller
may also liberate prosecutors in the states from whatever restraints
the Court's prior uncertainty on the relevant community standards
imposed. A Georgia prosecutor, for example, may now challenge
material that before Miller was judged by the prosecutor more
likely than not protected by the first amendment under national
community standards. The same material judged solely by the pros-
ecutor's sense of state or local community standards may now seem
more likely than not obscene. Some prosecutors, after Miller, may
find themselves compelled, for political reasons, among others, to
challenge material that before Miller they ignored or tolerated by
explaining that the Supreme Court prevented judging objectionable
material by state or local community standards. The lay public
may read the Court's rejection of national community standards
and solicitude for state and local diversity as an indirect invitation
to embark on crusades to vindicate their community standards by
suppressing smut.
If the public and prosecutors react to Miller in this fashion,
creators, distributors, exhibitors, and vendors of controversial sex
material may be unwilling to enter certain state or local markets
for fear of offending what are imagined to be the prevailing com-
munity standards and thus encountering expensive litigation and
the risk of criminal punishment. Films and publications, and perhaps
even theatrical productions, concerned in large part with sex in
one form or another may then be disseminated to the public only
66. Under certain circumstances, the non-resident might be held incompetent to testify
on these relevant but local standards.
67. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
68. Id. at 56.
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in those states or communities whose standards are judged able
to withstand or tolerate the material. From what has been said
and written concerning the film Deep Throat,69 those responsible
for its production and distribution probably anticipated obscenity
prosecutions anywhere in the nation the film was shown, regardless
of decisions of the Supreme Court. Conversely, it seems unlikely
that the producers and distributors of the films Last Tango in Paris70
and Carnal Knowledge7 1 anticipated obscenity prosecutions of those
films before Miller was decided. Presumably sex material will con-
tinue to be disseminated in "safe" but restricted market areas
within the United States if it is economically feasible to do so,
but will not be introduced into doubtful market areas within the
United States where civil or criminal litigation is likely. Conceding
that many citizens of Albany, Georgia,7 2 and Lubbock, Texas, 7
might be relieved to know that Carnal Knowledge and Last Tango
in Paris would not be exhibited in their cities, it nevertheless seems
tragic under the first amendment that other citizens in those cities
would be denied the opportunity, if they choose, to see and judge
these films.
If controversial sex material cannot survive commercially with
either restricted markets or the threat of excessive litigation under
state or local community standards, then controversial sex material
will no longer be produced for general public acceptance. If this
occurs, -each citizen of the United States is denied access to a
class of material which for each citizen may have value, as that
individual citizen defines or perceives his or her values. It is not
now possible to know the effects of Miller on the diversity of material
each citizen may see and read. Depending on where in the United
States the citizen resides, films like Last Tango in Paris and Carnal
Knowledge, and even Deep Throat, may or may not be exhibited
to the public. Or perhaps no citizen anywhere in the United States
will be able to see films like these because the cumulative legal
and commercial burdens and uncertain state and local community
standards outweigh the incentives for producing controverisal sex
material. As films go, The Sound of Music is very nice, but surely
the first amendment should not be construed to deny adult citizens
of any state or all adult citizens in the United States the opportunity
69. E.g., People v. Mature Enterprises, Inc., 41 U.S.L.W. 2498 (Crim. Ct. New York City,
Mar. 1, 1973).
70. The film Last Tango in Paris was prosecuted as obscene in Lubbock, Texas, in No-
vember, 1973, and the jury acquitted the exhibitor of showing an obscene film. State v.
Boyd, No. 56982 (County Court-at-Law, Lubbock County, Texas, Nov. 12, 1978).
71. The film Carnal Knowledge was found obscene in Albany, Georgia, and the exhibi-
tor's obscenity conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Jenkins v. State,
230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183 (1973), prob. juris. noted, 94 S.Ct. 719 (1973).
72. See note 71 supra.
73. See note 70 supra.
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to see the films Last Tango in Paris and Carnal Knowledge, and
perhaps even the film Deep Throat. Of course Miller does confine
the constitutional definition of obscenity to material concerned with
sex, so producers and distributors of controversial sex material
may divert their creative efforts toward new levels of violence
and gore.
Whether the preceding "speculations" are never, only partially,
or fully realized depends in large measure upon the future role
of the Supreme Court in reviewing obscenity cases, like Jenkins
v. Georgia7 4 in which the Court may elaborate upon its ambiguous
language in Miller. If obscenity cases reviewed by the Supreme
Court present "tough individual problems of constitutional judg-
ment," as Miller declares they do, will not these problems of con-
stitutional judgment be much tougher or impossible in state obscenity
cases after Miller? The value of deciding the question of obscenity
by reference to any community standard is debatable, but the use
of national community standards (society at large) 75 for deciding
obscenity at least facilitated an independent constitutional judgment
by the Justices of the Supreme Court, whether the question of ob-
scenity in a case before the Court is characterized as one of con-
stitutional judgment, constitutional fact, ultimate fact, or constitu-
tional law.76 The Justices are perceptive men capable of applying
their subjective constitutional definition of obscenity to material
found obscene in the state courts. Moreover, their judgment on
largely imaginary national community standards is scarcely less
valid than any other that might be made. Because they are the
Justices of the Supreme Court charged with interpreting the Con-
stitution, at least five can decide whether challenged material is
obscene under the first amendment.
Outright rejection of the national community standards as the
constitutional test for obscenity in state proceedings certainly creates
serious barriers for the continued exercise of the Court's independent
constitutional judgment on the obscene nature of material condemn-
ed in state courts. The Court's majority opinion in Miller invites
state trial courts to exclude evidence pertaining to national com-
munity standards. When material is found obscene in state proceed-
ings governed by state or local community standards, and that
finding -is sustained by the state appellate courts using state or
local community standards, how may the Supreme Court explain
a contrary finding under the Constitution when the Court's inter-
74. 94 S.Ct. 719 (1973), noting probable jurisdiction.
75. To Mr. Justice Brennan, "contemporary community standards" means the standards
of society at large. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964).
76. The Court has yet t9 fuly qh.rgcterize its role in reviewing obscenity decisions of
lower cAurM,
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pretation of the first amendment holds that state obscenity is es-
sentially a question of fact governed by state or lesser community
standards? Are the Justices competent to apply or even determine
the contemporary community standards of Albany, Georgia, or for
that matter, the community standards of the entire state of Georgia?
If the trier of fact was instructed to determine the question
of obscenity by applying the Miller three-element definition, and
the resulting judgment of obscenity has survived appellate review
in the state courts, reversal by the Supreme Court is indefensible
after Miller. Miller allows the states to apply state and possibly
local community standards, but it seems unlikely that the Supreme
Court would in a later case rule that the state courts, trial and
appellate, did not understand their own community standards. If
the Court did reverse a state judgment of obscenity, determined
under proper Miller guidelines, by explaining that findings of ob-
scenity present ultimate questions of constitutional law for the Su-
preme Court, the result after Miller is even -more anomalous. Char-
acterizing the question of obscenity as a question of constitutional
law is not helpful 'because the Court's interpretation of the Consti-
tution in Miller holds that this particular question of constitutional
law is one that may be decided by state or local community stand-
ards, of which only the citizens and trial and appellate judges of
each state have knowledge.7
Under this interpretation of Miller, the majority should not and
could not reverse Billy Jenkins' obscenity conviction for exhibiting
the film Carnal Knowledge in Albany, Georgia, if the trier of fact
had been instructed to decide Billy's guilt or innocence by the
using the Miller three--element definition of obscenity. In future
obscenity cases, a record presented to the Supreme Court showing
that the Miller instructions were given to the trier of fact will
excuse the Court from viewing the challenged material and will
preclude an independent constitutional judgement by the Court be-
cause Miller makes the final judgment of the state courts conclu-
sive on the question of obscenity if the Miller guidelines were used.
To summarize the speculative effects of Miller on the Court's
future role in reviewing state obscenity cases, it seems the Court
has made its bed but does not want to lie in it.78 Concededly,
the majority's language in Miller is unclear, but rejection of national
community standards appears to lead to these speculative results
and to the substantial dilution of first amendment rights of indivi-
dual citizens throughout the United States by the vagaries of imagi-
nary state and local community standards.
. 77. It would be difficult for the Justices of the Supreme Court to assert that they have
a better understanding of state standards than the citizens and judges of that state.
78. This judgment, phrased inelegantly, is premature, but it does seem unavoidable.
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Perhaps the majority in Miller will escape these speculative
consequences by declaring that only questions of prurient interest
and patent offensiveness are to be decided by essentially unreview-
able appraisals of state and local community standards, but that
the third element of the Miller definition of obscenity, the "serious
value" test, is either a question of constitutional judgment for the
Court or is to be decided by national community standards. Although
the Court indicates at one place in Miller that the "serious value"
of the challenged material is a proper question for the trier of
fact,"' the majority strangely omits the issues of "serious value"
from its later discussion rejecting national community stand-
ards for deciding the issues of prurient interest and patent offensive-
ness.8 0 It is conceivable that the Court intends to reserve for its
ultimate review and final "constitutional judgment" only the question
of the "serious value" of challenged material, which is certainly
a position consistent with the Court's Roth and Miller rulings that
the first amendment protects only expression possessing value or
importance. If the Miller majority decides in the future to reserve
the question of "serious value" for its independent judgment, per-
haps films like Last Tango in Paris and Carnal Knowledge will
be found within the protection of the first amendment despite con-
trary judgments on their "serious value" by triers of fact applying
state or local community standards, or by state trial and appellate
judges applying even national standards of "serious value."
If this is the device chosen to avoid Miller, and is used in
the future, perhaps in Jenkins v. Georgia,81 the Court's decision
in Miller means only that the Justices of the Supreme Court are
better judges of "serious value" under the first amendment than
other citizens.8 2 Perhaps they are and perhaps they are not, but
nothing changes the fact that judgments on the "serious value"
of any form of expression remain personal and subjective. Once
freedom to speak, to publish, to read, to view is limited to freedom
to speak, to publish, to read, to view something of value, the freedom
enjoyed depends on the subjective definition of value, a judgment
made by others, be they jurors in Georgia, state appellate judges,
or Justices of the United States Supreme Court.
IV. EPILOGUE
For the sake of Billy Jenkins, the people of Georgia, and the
79. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
80. Id. at 30-84.
81. 94 S.Ct. 719 (1973), noting probable jurisdiction.
82. That the Justices are more sensitive to the societal values protected by the first
amendment is readily conceded, but their superior capacity to judge the serious value of a
particular book or film is surely less apparent.
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first amendment, the Supreme Court should reverse Billy's obscenity
conviction for showing the film Carnal Knowledge. The Court should
reverse for the sole reason that Carnal Knowledge is not and could
not be found beyond the protection of the first amendment anywhere
in the United States. The Court should decide this question by exer-
cising its constitutional judgment, avoiding any device to defer or
obscure this plain judgment. This conclusion is subjective, but ob-
scenity, by constitutional definition, is subjective. Those who believe
that American adults should have "complete freedom to produce,
deal in, possess and consume" 's all communicative materials under
the first amendment should seek restoration of this freedom in
the legislatures.
The Supreme Court dislikes the commercial exploitation of ob-
scene material, but the exercise of first amendment rights is fre-
quently undertaken for profit. Mere commercialization of first
amendment rights is not per se objectionable, so the objection is
directed toward the obscene material. Why is obscene material ob-
jectionable? Because to some or many obscenity is disgusting. Criti-
cism of Roth, and now Miller, for denying first amendment protec-
tion to obscene material might be taken as a position favoring
the obscene, but the principle of freedom of expression must protect
the bad if it is to protect the good. Absent substantial evidence
that exposure to obscene material causes crimes, 5 suppression of
obscene material for adults is justified by societal interests in pro-
tecting and perpetuating prevailing standards of morality and de-
cency.8 s But if the prevailing morality is worthy of perpetuation,
will it not survive what are imagined to be the corrosive effects
of free access for adults to sex material now deemed obscene?
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85. See note 47 supra; cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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